From the Party/State to Multiethnic Democracy: Education and Social Cohesion in Europe and Central Asia

Stephen P. Heyneman

Peabody College, Vanderbilt University

Can educational mechanisms lower social tension and help achieve social cohesion? If so, how are these mechanisms defined and measured? What is the experience to date with the social utility of education mechanisms? How can one differentiate between an education system that is doing a good job of reinforcing social cohesion and one that is doing a poor job? In this paper, I attempt to respond to these questions by (a) briefly reviewing some concepts of institutional and organizational economics so that the economic implications of education's social cohesion functions can be more clear, (b) reviewing the origins of public schooling so that the reader may place today's educational challenges in historical context, (c) reviewing the anecdotal and field experience to date in the European and Central Asian (ECA) region in meeting the challenges of social cohesion, and (d) drawing some comparisons between the social cohesion performance of education systems in the ECA region and that of the U.S. In sum, I argue that social cohesion has significant economic benefits; that since its invention in the 17th century, public education has been one of the main contributions to social cohesion in the west; but that countries of the ECA region are having a difficult time replicating the western education experience. In fact, when compared to other parts of the world, the U.S. school system seems to perform rather well with respect to its social cohesion functions.

In the last 6 years, 27 countries have emerged anew in Europe and Central Asia. Though far from uniform, the trend is to move away from having a single political party manage the state and its economic apparatus. Many countries have written new constitutions guaranteeing individual freedoms and liberties, encouraged private economic and social organizations, declared private ownership of property to be legal, encouraged entrepreneurial private enterprise, and fostered new political and trade relationships with international organizations and foreign countries. After many years of religious prohibition, worship is permitted, and in some instances, encouraged. Citizens are free to travel domestically and abroad, free to participate in debate over public policy, and free to vote for public leaders.

However, the transition from party/state to open, multiethnic democracy has not been easy. Untested by experience, open democracy has proved to be an imperfect tool for effectively establishing domestic policy. Historical tensions have emerged among ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. New tensions have resulted from the inconsistency of legislative and legal institutions and the spontaneous growth of inequality in income, property, and economic power. Adjudicating institutions, courts of law, and the laws themselves have failed to keep pace with the evolving needs of the environment in which they operated. Additionally, the media and local elected officials have sometimes proven to be uncertain of their new functions, weak, unstable and open to corruption. The result has been a growth in social tension.

There have been many international efforts to advise and assist the new European and Central Asian (ECA) countries on questions of fiscal stabilization and privatization of property. Social problems have garnered less attention and more resistance to addressing them. Nevertheless, social tension may be the principal determining factor gov-

173

erning the future relationships among the new countries with each other, with international investors, and with the world community generally.

Part I. Economics of Social Cohesion

According to Douglas North, there are three reasons why "history matters": (a) we can learn from it, (b) our future depends on the continuity of current institutions, and (c) our choices are shaped by our experience (North, 1990, p. vii). One of the principal lessons of history is a fact so obvious that it is sometimes ignored. Economic development is made possible through human cooperation. Cooperation offers the possibility of individuals and nations to accumulate or maximize economic gains that have resulted from creative enterprise and the trade which that enterprise engenders. Because of the complexities of measurement, this branch of economics, institutional economics, is not the most well known. Basically it concerns the study of these mechanisms for "human cooperation" and how they work (Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990; Olson, 1965, 1982).

There seem to be two elements that make cooperation possible. First are the *institutional rules* that guide all types of organizations. Second are the *stabilizing traditions* within the organizations themselves. Institutional rules include codes for public conduct, norms for private behavior, manifest statutes, common law, and contracts among individuals and organizations. An organization consists of groups of individuals bound together for a common purpose. Stabilizing traditions within each organization differ from one another. There are many types of organizations, but, in general, they can be reduced to four basic categories: (a) political bodies, such as legislatures, and so forth; (b) economic bodies, such as firms; (c) social bodies, such as churches; and (d) educational bodies, such as schools and universities.

Each type of organization makes its own contribution to social cohesion. Political bodies organize the debate and establish the means for public policy. Economic bodies organize entrepreneurial endeavors and generate income. Social bodies bind people to moral norms. What about schools? What functions do schools have and why do nations invest in schools?

Social Functions of Education

Some economists suggest that the inability of societies to develop low-cost and effective self-regu-

lating mechanisms for enforcement of social contracts prevents economic development (Bates, 1989). The concept of a social contract is broader than a legal contract. A social contract includes, for instance, a willingness to pay taxes and fulfill other public obligations; it may include the willingness to participate in public affairs, maintain cleanliness of one's property, act responsibly, and be a good citizen. In instances where a society's general philosophy, such as racial tolerance for one's fellow citizens, conflicts with one's private opinion, the social contract of racial tolerance is expected to take precedence, particularly in public fora. Countries that lack economic development are often associated with an environment in which contracts are not enforceable by any mechanism, and most certainly are not self-regulating.

People are more likely to adhere to social contracts under certain conditions. They are more likely to adhere to contracts when they do not consider each other to be cultural "strangers"; that is, when they have more understanding of each other as people, as citizens of the same country, or as citizens of a "similar" country where it is believed that the same norms and expectations govern social contracts. People are more likely to adhere to social contracts when they have a greater understanding of the reasons for those contracts, and are more knowledgeable about the sanctions that may be expected in the event of noncompliance. The most common mechanism for achieving compliance is through the state, particularly through the state's authority to sanction. But states can become tyrannical. In a tyranny, those who run the state may force compliance in their own interest at the expense of the rest of society. The challenge then is to achieve compliance without tyranny.

The most effective check against tyranny is a public consensus on the definition of tyranny; on the rights of those who believe they are the objects of tyranny; and on the obligations and responsibilities of those who use coercive power. Such a consensus makes it more difficult for tyranny to occur because it can be more easily identified and controlled. How can this public consensus come about, and more importantly, how can it be passed to the young?

Each of the four types of organizations—political, economic, social, and educational—helps contribute to the public consensus. Education contributes in three ways. First, it helps provide public knowledge about social contracts themselves, what

174

they mean, why they are important, and so forth. Second, education helps provide the behavior expected under social contracts, in part through the socially heterogeneous experiences students have in the schools themselves. Third, education helps provide an understanding of the expected consequences for breaking social contracts. These three reasons comprise the social rationales for public education, and hence the social rationales for investments in public education.

When there is a consensus on behavior, unregulated by state sanction, that consensus is called "social capital" (Coleman, 1988). Social capital refers to certain norms that make government, the economy, and the national community work better (Ruffin, McCarter, & Upjohn, 1996). It involves the development of shared understandings that increase the level of trust and willingness to act in ways that will benefit a community even when the benefit to the individual self is not immediately obvious.[1]

Countries differ significantly in the degree of social capital with which they are endowed. As a quantity, it is tangible. It is productive. Social capital makes possible the achievement of certain ends that otherwise would not have been possible. It comes about through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action (Coleman, 1986; 1987). Investments may be made in social capital wisely, or not. But there is a tendency not to invest wisely. Unlike physical capital and most human capital,[2] the benefits of social capital are not easily captured by the individual. There is therefore less incentive to invest in social capital. For instance, the social norms that govern good citizenship may not primarily benefit the individual actor whose effort is necessary to bring about good behavior. Instead the benefits accrue to others who are part of the society. Many structures, such as family, church, and community organizations, are necessary to bring about good citizenship behavior in the face of such imbalanced benefits. One of the most important structures in this regard are the schools, hence the importance of schools as public investments particularly in those societies where citizenship behavior is new and untested. This, in essence, is the mechanism by which education contributes to political development in new nations.

The Sustainability of Social Capital

Social capital can be influenced by effective schooling, but how can it be sustained? What changes interaction from being a single experience to becoming a habit? The answer has to do with the nature of tradition.[3] It requires three generations to create a tradition. Traditions may begin as a compendium of single experiences, but they become codified over time until they represent a "massive presentness" in which the past "lives in the present" and serves as a guide for action (Shils, 1981, p. 34). Public schooling attempts very consciously to generate traditions in the manner by which citizens treat each other. Putnam (1993) has described how weak social capital, rooted in tradition, affects community development in Southern Italy.[4] Samuelson (1998) describes the manner by which social capital works from a "critical boiling point" in which the sum of a multiple number of similar yet small events occur, and turn the market in a new direction. Creating the direction of the "market" in social interaction among citizens is the traditional reason for public education.

Part II. The History of Public Education

Mechanisms to impart organized wisdom have been developed in each culture. The concept of public education, however, is a different matter. Public rationales for sending children to school were first articulated in the time of Martin Luther, about 400 years ago, and initially centered on the need to improve public morality:

> I am of the opinion that the government is obligated to compel its citizenry to send their children to school. If a government can compel its citizens to bear spear and gun, to run about on the city wall and to assume other duties when it desires to carry on war, how much more can and should the government compel its citizens to keep their children at school. (Luther, 1530, cited in Helmreich, 1959, p. 15)

The Prince of Wurttemberg, in 1559, is acknowledged to be the first of a series of German political leaders to sponsor state schools, but it wasn't until 1717 that Frederick William I made urban education compulsory and helped provide finance for the education of children from homes that could otherwise not afford it.[5] It is his son, Frederick the Great, however, who is credited as being the "father" of public education. It was Frederick the Great who deviated from having a single public religious morality as the principal rationale for public schooling. Because Prussia had recently acquired lands in which there were Catholics as well as Protes-

175

tants, in his *Generallandschulreglement* in 1763, and later in the *Allgemeine Landrecht* of 1794, he established the principle of compulsory education (for both urban and rural areas), the state's supervisory role with respect to private (usually church) providers, and most importantly, the principle of tolerance toward confessional activities in lieu of a common Prussian loyalty.

> There are few lands in which all citizens have the same religion, and the question arises: is such unity to be forced or can one permit every one [*sic*] to think according to his own views? To this the answer must be that it is impossible to establish such unity. . . . general tolerance alone guarantees the happiness of the state. (Frederick the Great, 1763, cited in Helmreich, 1959, p. 29)

The philosophic foundation for public education as it is known today, however, was established in the 19th century in France by Francois Guizot (1787–1874), in New England by Horace Mann (1796–1859), and in the Netherlands by Petras Hofstede de Groot (1802–1886). With each, the effort to enlighten a nation through a system of popular education was concerned more with attitudes and values than with the skills of literacy and numeracy. As Glenn observes, "popular education was not simply, or even primarily, to teach literacy or other skills but to develop the common attitudes and values considered essential to a society in which broader and broader circles of the population were entering public life" (1988, p. 45). As Charles Brooks remarked, "education could no longer be left to private initiative or allowed to take as many different forms as there were sponsoring organizations; too much was at stake" (Brooks, 1837, cited in Glenn, 1988, p. 46).

What was "at stake" was the forging of a nation based not on principles of tyrannical control but, for the first time, one based on the informed consent of the governed, across the full gamut of religions, classes, languages, and ethnicities from which the modern heterogeneous state was contrived. As Stiep Stuurman put it,

> Through education and propagation of (common) culture among all classes, the circle of citizens could be broadened, as would the basis of the state. . . . a homogeneous Dutch nation would come into being. This is the political core of the common school policies, the school as a nation-forming institution must not be divided among sectarian schools or left in the hands of an exclusive political or church party. (1983, pp. 116–117)

To some extent, the success of the modern Netherlands, with the merging of Catholic and Protestant subpopulations, can be attributed to the success of the public school and the overriding ethos of tolerance that was enforced through the state in both Catholic and Protestant educational curricula. In New England, however, the subpopulations were more numerous, hence the challenge more complex. The solution in New England seemed to rest on a common school managed by the state and independent from all sectarian control.[6] As W. S. Datton explained in 1848,

> The children of this country, of whatever parentage, should not wholly but to a certain extent be educated together—be educated not as Baptists, or Methodists, or Episcopalians, or Presbyterians; not as Roman Catholics or Protestants, still less as foreigners in language or spirit, but as Americans, as made of one blood and citizens of the same free country,—educated to be one harmonious people. The common school system, if wisely and liberally conducted, is well fitted in part at least to accomplish this. While it does not profess to give a complete education and allows ample opportunity for instruction and training in denominational peculiarities elsewhere, it yet brings the children of all sects together, gives them, to a limited extent a common like education, and, by such education and by the commingling, acquaintance and fellowship which it involves in the early unprejudiced and impressionable periods of life, assimilates and unites them. (p. 166)

What would be the social cost for not having a system of public education? As Horace Bushnell argues, not having such a system would weaken the security of the nation and endanger the liberties on which it had been founded:

> This great institution, the common school, is not only a part of the state, but it is imperiously wanted as such, for the common training of so many classes and conditions of people. There needs to be some place where in early childhood, they may be brought together and made acquainted with each other. . . . without common schools the disadvantage that accrues to the state, in the loss of so much character, and so many cross ties of mutual respect and general appreciation, the embittering so fatally of all outward distinctions, and the propagation of so many misunderstandings . . . weakens immensely, the security of the state, and even its liberties. (Bushnell, 1847, p. 27)

Much thought has been given to how schools

might teach values, but none summarizes the process better than the comment cited by Hyman and Wright: "Children learn to think about what it is like to be another person. They cultivate their systematic imaginations" (1979, p. 67). As Stephen Bailey points out,

[I]f education for political development means anything it means the assertion of these value universals and the delineation of man's attempts over the centuries to fashion and to perfect instruments of law, administration and the politics to create—not the Great Leviathan—but the good society. This does not mean that (new) countries must slavishly copy (western) laws and constitutions. It does mean that whatever laws and constitutions they fashion for themselves must place restrictions upon the character and exercise of political power. In essence, man's long political odyssey has some universal lessons. Like its Homeric analogue, man's political odyssey has had its Cyclops and its Circes, its Scyllas and Charybdices. Wise leaders throughout history have lashed themselves and their crews to the masts of law to escape the siren call of demagogic tyranny. . . . Surely (new) nations need not recapitulate all the sorry political errors of history, any more than they need revert to a labored progression beginning with stone implements to prepare themselves for the wonders of modern technology. To pretend that education has something useful to say about the conquest of disease, poverty and technological backwardness, but nothing to say about political backwardness, seems to me fantastic. . . . if education in (new) countries cannot or will not affirm these things it will have missed its imperative mission. (1963, pp. 57–59)

Have schools been successful at fostering social cohesion? The evidence is ambiguous because the influence of education on nonmonetary benefits is particularly difficult to isolate from other influences. But there has been some progress in spite of the difficulties (Comer, 1988; Corman, 1986; Duncan, 1976; Haveman & Wolfe, 1984, 1994; Michael, 1982; Olson, 1977; Olsen & Zeckhauser, 1974; Wachtel, 1975; Wolfe & Zunekas, 1997). Research has included the following: schools' roles in broadening outlook and increasing tolerance and desire to participate in the political process (Lipset, 1959); the association between more and better education and a nation's democratic stability (Almond & Verba, 1963; Puryear, 1994); the connection between educational structures and democratic stability (Kamens, 1998; Meyer, 1970); the degree to which more education is associated with greater voluntary political participation (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1976; Gintis, 1971; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik, 1996; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978); the connection between education and an individual's orientation toward legal behavior and good citizenship (Ehrilch, 1975; Hahn, 1977; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995; Torney-Purta, 1995, 1996, 1997); and the association between classroom climate and civic behavior (Becker, 1963; Butts, 1980; Torney-Purta & Schwille, 1986).

There has been comparatively little research on the influence of specific curricula such as social studies or civics on values or behavior (Chazan & Soltis, 1974; Torney-Purta, 1996; Torney-Purta, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975). On the other hand, as Lawrence Cremin points out, when placed in context the influence of schools is surprisingly robust. "It is not that schooling lacks potency," he says, "it is that the potency of schooling must be seen in relation to the potency of other experiences" (Cremin, 1976, p. 36). In general, however, education can make a contribution to social cohesion through four separate mechanisms: (a) by providing an equality of educational opportunity for all citizens; (b) by achieving a public consensus on what to teach the young about citizenship and history; (c) by providing an ethnically tolerant climate in the classroom environment; and (d) by establishing democratic institutions (such as school boards) to adjudicate when there are differences of opinion about whether the first three mechanisms have been achieved.

Interim Summary

The essence of public schools and their principal rationale for socializing the population does not conform to the typical economic rationales for investment in education. The dissemination of literacy, numeracy, and many other skills constitute economic benefits that accrue to the individuals who experience schooling. But the principal rationale, and the reasons nations invest in public education, have traditionally been the social purpose of schooling. This social purpose originated from the time when the first multiethnic nations were being constructed (Maynew, 1985; McConnell, 1963). The principal task of public schooling, properly organized and delivered, has traditionally been to create harmony within a nation of divergent peoples.

177

Public schooling is an investment in the "social contract" whose benefits are believed to accrue not only to the individual who experiences schooling but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the wider society. The current challenge of education in the ECA region is analogous to the challenge faced by education in the early 19th and 20th centuries in Europe and North America. That challenge is to forge new nations at peace within themselves while, at the same time, tolerant of their often very divergent neighbors. As David McClelland reminds us, "The world's biggest problem is how to keep the peace. The world's second largest problem is how to achieve prosperity" (1963, p. 61). The first is essential for the second.

Part III. The Education Challenge of the Transition

The Challenge of Overcoming the Inheritance

One common impression is that education under the party/state was both effective and excellent. As evidence it was common to point to technical achievements—nuclear weapons, space travel, advanced computer systems, and the like. Olympiads in mathematics and science were widely interpreted as signs that the education system was of high quality. This association between technical achievement and the quality of education, however, involves a set of shaky assumptions. As Anderson observes about the United States,

> We produced the atomic bomb at a time when critics were lamenting the supposed deterioration of our schools. The bomb was created by a few scientists with unlimited resources, though the craftsmen who produced the delicate instruments were no less essential. The quality of our schools may have been irrelevant to this feat. Similarly, Sputnik proves little about the general quality of Soviet schools. (1959, p. 27)[7]

However questionable the evidence of academic quality, still it is evident that the education system under the party/state was effectively delivered. Access to schooling was universal, even in rural areas. Literacy among adults was nearly universal. Female representation in higher education was near parity. Since the structures were already in place at the beginning of the transition, couldn't these achievements continue?

For several reasons, the characteristics that made the education system effective under the party/state could not continue once the assumptions of the economy and the polity had changed.[8] The previous system was designed structurally to respond to the demand of central planning; these structures have had to be completely reformed. Such structural reforms have been described in some detail in other contexts (Heyneman, 1994, 1995a, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 1998b; Heyneman & Todoric-Bebic, in press; Glenn, 1995; World Bank, 1995).

More complex than changes in structure has been the necessity to change the philosophy. The entire system of education under the party/state was predicated on an assumption of a fixed logic of behavior, a logic carefully developed in the ideological branch of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in Moscow and supposedly enforced with vigor within every school, in every subject, and at every grade level. It was the logic of the "true believer" (Hoffer, 1958); that is, it was developed by those who had been carefully vetted so that doubt and uncertainty could be eliminated.

Marxist/Leninist curricula theories were infused into each subject, including the sciences, so that emphasis could be laid on character formation consistent with the needs of the state. Described by Bronfenbrenner (1968), the methods of character formation differed significantly from those in the west. Under the party/state, heavy use was made of the power of peer pressure to enforce conformity. The means to achieve this conformity were carefully laid out with the content of four basic courses in Marxist/ Leninist thought, which every student in higher education was required to take. They included the History of the Communist Party of the USSR, Dialectical Materialism, Introduction to Marxism and Leninism, and Historical Materialism. In 1963, a fifth course was added: Sound Fundamentals of Basic Atheism.[9]

The courses inculcated a fixed philosophy for the purpose of explaining why the communist system was superior, why the communist party was the ultimate authority for questions on personal behavior, and why individuals were fortunate to be a part of the overall Soviet system and society (DeWitt, 1968). Outside the Soviet Union these courses differed in tone and emphasis. Nevertheless, in one form or another they were present in every school system in Eastern and Central Europe. The logic was fixed and complete in the sense that it was designed to answer all possible questions and guide all possible inquiries toward a fixed network of authority.

It was common for intelligent students (and the intelligentsia in general) to privately hold this ideology in disdain.[10] Nevertheless, all students were compelled to publicly demonstrate concurrence and adherence to its logic. This "public show" of fealty within schools lowered the status of the education system in general, as well as the teaching profession. Disdain for the politicized elements in the curriculum profoundly biased demand for particular courses of study and for particular professions. Since the content of the social sciences and humanities was heavily influenced by the political party, demand for study in these areas was low. Demand was higher for courses sheltered from political interference. Science, technology, theoretical mathematics, solid state physics, and nuclear engineering, for instance, were better protected from political interference and less subject to ideological distortion in the criteria for academic excellence. Hence, these areas were considered more prestigious.[11]

The social sciences were considered risky by political authorities because they included inquiry about what motivates human nature and what people truly believe. Posing these as empirical questions to be investigated was profoundly threatening to party authorities, for it could imply that those authorities did not in fact already have the answers. Social sciences and humanities were therefore subject to significantly more political control.

Similar controls and differences in prestige were associated with different types of educational institutions. Because they had often been established prior to the party/state and held to universal traditions of academic freedom and the "pursuit of truth," universities raised concerns among political authorities. There were worries that university faculty might question official interpretations of history, the effectiveness of public policies, or the certainty of what was held to be popular opinion. For this reason, universities were often unfavored by comparison to technical and engineering institutions. Fields of engineering and polytechnics expanded rapidly and were offered prime choices of property, laboratory equipment, and faculty salaries. As Eisemon, Ionescu-Sisesti, Davis, and Gaillard (1995) observe with respect to Romania,

> Policies strongly encouraged national scientific and technological autarchy. The allocation of resources reflected the priority given in national economic planning. . . . In the 1980's more than 80 percent of the funded research projects were

directed to the heavy machinery, manufacturing and construction industries. . . . Most of the rest of the R&D investment was expended on other kinds of applied research. Little funding was provided for fundamental research and almost none at all for social science and academic research that was not production oriented and carried out under the direction of either government scientific institutions or enterprises. . . . gross distortions in the mission of higher education and research institutions are an important legacy of the socialist period. (p. 109)

The Educational Challenge of an Open Society

Creating an effective and excellent education system in an open society and multiparty democracy is significantly different and profoundly more complex than it was under the party/state. There is little experience in the ECA region in meeting the new demands. As Wilson, Williams, and Sugarman remind us,

> There is an important sense in which a liberal society has a harder job than an authoritarian one. In politics, there is a simplicity about a dictatorship which is lacking to a democracy. If you go in for a master-slave system, you need only a few orders and a whip: if you go in for freedom, you need all sorts of complicated mechanisms and contexts of communication—availability of information, voting, debates, rules of procedure and so forth. In the same way, moral education requires more attention in liberal societies. Indeed . . . the concepts of morality and education themselves imply some kind of liberal theory, which is to be contrasted with the mere conditioning of behavior; and any genuine form of moral education will therefore require more thought and planning than a comparatively simple program of brain-washing or indoctrination. (1967, p. 16)

Curriculum challenges in open societies in transition generally fall into three categories. First there is the challenge of pedagogy. The emphasis must shift to the complexities of *student learning* as distinct from the content of teaching. Next there is the challenge of introducing *new subject matter,* which often have no precedent in the region—western economics, accounting methods, civil rights law, business administration, and the like. Last, and by far the most complex, are the changes necessary in the teaching of *civics education, social studies, and history.* A few words, in turn, about each.

Student learning. Under the party/state, students were treated as receptacles for information. In spite

179

of the existence of a long liberal local tradition in pedagogical philosophy (Ushinski, Vygotsky, Tolstoy), Soviets reduced the accepted expertise in education to a few simple principles, none of which included differences in student interest, motivation, or orientation. The Great Soviet encyclopedia of 1955, for instance, mentions only five names of those who have made a contribution to Soviet education—Marx, Engles, Lenin, Stalin, and Makarenko (W.W.B., 1957, p. 13). The first four were not educators at all, but rather political philosophers and/or dictators, thus illustrating the irrelevance of the student in the teaching/learning equation. The latter (Makarenko) established his reputation largely on the successful "training" of delinquents and orphans on the basis of a rigorous program, selective subject matter, and a clear, definitive routine.

Many articulate local educators were dissatisfied with the ignorance of the education philosophy under the party/state, so much so that it is fair to suggest that the reforms in education predated changes in either the economy or the government (Eklof & Dneprov, 1993; Kerr, 1990, 1994; Mitter, 1996; Prucha, 1992). The ranges of current pedagogies and specializations now mirror those available in Western Europe. They include specializations based on classical traditions (gymnasia, lyceums, foreign languages, dance); religious beliefs (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Islam); pedagogical philosophies (Steiner, Montessori, Dewey, Schiller); and economic demand (banking, economics, business orientations, and the like). Radical by most standards of reform, these choices were put into place in the ECA region with an initial speed and enthusiasm similar to that of private property and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Freeing education from the "dead hand" of centrally enforced uniformity was seen as a requirement to prevent such control from being reinstated: Break it quickly and break it thoroughly so that it cannot be put back together. Given the universal resentment that grew out of the history of treating children as ideological conduits, the speed and certainty of these reforms is understandable.

As a task it is simpler to articulate the changes in teaching philosophy than it is to demonstrate changes in the classroom. To be sure, there is a long way to go before the philosophic changes represent a normal experience for students. Nevertheless the problems of implementation in the transition may not be significantly more complicated than in other education systems around the world. Successes achieved thus far should not be minimized. The wide acceptance of the need to shift away from fixed-formula teaching toward treating students differently based on learning style and interest is one of the greater success stories of the transition. It is fair to speculate, however, that this success has occurred because the demand for pedagogical change was local in origin and the mechanisms to achieve it, domestic in design. The same cannot be said of the other two categories of curriculum challenge.

New subject matter. Administering an economy by planning it, and managing a political system by enforcing debateless policy, implies a set of intellectual underpinnings very different from those required by a free-market open democracy. Under the party/state, studying "economics" was analogous to how Westerners might classify a training course for public administration. Emphasis was placed on how to plan. The content paid little attention to prices and costs, included little or no concept of profit or net yield. Additionally, there were no courses of study that included business practice, or legal specializations that might cover copyright, civil rights, education, agriculture, transport, or environment law. On the other hand, under the party/state there was a prolific range of engineering courses of study because technology was considered politically "safe" and useful for state production.[12] The engineering curriculum in market economies, however, is often very different from the curriculum under the party/state. In the latter, emphasis was placed on incorporating the principles of mechanics in the basic sciences—heat transfer, energy, durability. The major concern was "will it work?" In market economies, the engineering curriculum is more complex. Not only must it incorporate the principles of mechanics, but it also has to ask whether it "will work" if there is a change in prices, environmental standards, copyright law, marketability, consumer demand, cost, productions efficiency, or required profit margin.

Today there are examples in the ECA region of new curricular content in many of these areas of study (Civic Education Project, 1997). However, the new curricula sometimes result from direct, and often imperfect, translations of western precedents and can be presented in the classroom with the same stultifying didactic style which characterized the party/state. Thus, a curriculum change does not necessarily represent the solution to the problem.

180

On the other hand, there are ample examples of good precedent where new curricula are designed specifically for the ECA region's students, and in a pedagogically modern manner that underpins new principles of student learning. One illustration is the economics curriculum designed in collaboration between the SLO (the Dutch national curriculum organization) and Moscow State Pedagogical University. This curriculum explains the nature of economics: that various aspects of economics differ depending on one's own role and function. There are chapters which require the student to see economics from different roles: from that of a public citizen, a property owner, a producer, a consumer, a participant in a financial market, an insurer, and finally, as a head of a family with a tight budget (Levitsky & van den Broek, 1995).

Another illustration of an excellent new text is that of *Adventures of a Little Man* (Usachev, 1994), in which a little green man defends the principles of the environment against decisions of powerful figures and institutions by using the court system. The institutions challenged by the "little man" include political and military leaders, a story which only a decade ago could have been interpreted as sedition and may well have led the textbook author to prison. That this textbook and many others like it are approved by the Russian Federal Ministry of Education for use in public schools is a tangible sign of education progress.

Civics, social studies, and history. Far and away the greatest educational challenge in the ECA region, and the problem with the widest implications outside the region, is the problem of teaching civics, social studies, and history.[13] Three important reasons are necessary to mention by way of background. First, of the 27 nations in the ECA region, none are monolingual, monoethnic, or monoreligious. The religious population of Albania is 70% Muslim, 20% Orthodox, and 10% Roman Catholic. The ethnic population of Estonia is 62% Estonian, 30% Russian, and 8% consisting of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Finns. The ethnic population of Kyrgyzstan is 53% Kyrgyz, 21% Russian, 13% Uzbek, 2.5% Ukrainian, 2.5% German, and 8% others. The populations of Hungary, Georgia, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uzbekistan, and each of the others represent similar complexities.

Second, while organization of the school system is hardly uniform throughout the region, the authority to design curricula is now in many instances a local responsibility. No longer is there a single political party to enforce discipline and standardize content. Even where there is a national curriculum, such as in the Russian Federation, the application of the curriculum, by design, is not standard. Classroom teachers have more professional latitude to interpret, to target pedagogy and content differently, and to place emphasis based on local needs as seen by local authorities. How can a country raise national standards but at the same time encourage local curricular control?

One successful illustration is Hungary, which changed the meaning of curriculum from syllabus (number of courses, class schedules, hours of math instruction) to performance standards (behavior expected of a student upon graduation). Hungarian performance standards are inspired by democratic values and are designed to give equal weight to the interests of the individual and the wider community, to balance national standards containing "fundamental domains" with a wide latitude of curricular and pedagogical choice that supports professional autonomy. Schools now choose material and group it however they want, in whatever concentration or sequence they want, as long as they uphold the common performance standards for graduating students.

Third, ethnic, linguistic, racial, national, and religious differences take on a different characteristic in the ECA region by comparison to other parts of the world. In the first place there is a lack of linguistic clarity between what is meant by "nationality" and what is meant by "ethnicity." Until 1997 for instance, Russian citizens carried an identity card (an internal passport) which listed their "nationality"—Buriat, Jew, German, Kazakh, Russian. All were "Russian citizens," but with different "nationalities."

In addition, many ethnic and religious histories are inflammatory due to the particularly harsh political tradition in the region. There are grievances in the former party/states, which, for the most part, are unparalleled in the West, resulting in unique educational complications (Anweiler, 1992; Broxup, 1992; Broxup & Bennigsen, 1983; Karavetz, 1978; Kirkwood, 1991; Rywkin, 1990; Shadrikov, 1993; Shorish, 1984, 1991; Wheeler, 1962). With the exception of Africans in the 18th century or American Indians sent against their will to reservations, minorities in the west tended to settle in certain regions for reasons of personal preference. The Japanese who migrated to Hawaii, the

Jamaicans who left for London, the Moroccans working in Paris, the Swedes living in Minnesota, the Irish making their homes in Boston did so, by and large, to seek a better life.

In the former party/states, however, minorities in many instances were moved forcibly for political reasons. German-speakers were relocated to Siberia away from the war front. Korean-speakers were moved to Central Asia. Jews, Cossacks, Tatars, Buriats, Poles, Georgians, and many others were relocated to distant and unfamiliar territory. Until today, these displaced peoples have had no genuine political voice or authority over matters of what they wish to teach the young. Now they often have both voice and authority. More importantly, there are few institutional traditions of democratic procedures, such as local school boards, to act as constraints. Using curriculum to rectify "old wrongs" is one of the first demands of local ethnic authorities. Some may attribute responsibility for their predicament to particular individuals—Stalin, for instance. Others may direct the blame at particular groups—Russians, Romanians, and Poles, for example.

As an illustration, approximately one half of the 89 regions in the Russian Federation have minority populations of sufficient size to generate debate over which language should be used as the language of instruction. The number of languages used in Russian public schools doubled between 1991 and 1995. Four different languages (other than Russian) used to be permitted (Georgian, Tatar, Bashkir, and Armenian). Today, nine languages are permitted as languages of instruction (the first five, plus Buriat, Urdmurt, Chuvash, and Iakut), and a total of 87 languages are used in other parts of the curriculum. In some instances, non-Russian languages are used for instruction in schools where Russian speakers are in the minority. This adds a different dimension to the question of protecting "minority rights." The question remains as to how basic tenets of a society, such as loyalty and citizenship, can be guaranteed if curriculum authority over humanities, languages, and history is devolved to local communities and schools as the Russian education legislation of 1992 guarantees.

Ethnic groups in the ECA region have long been used as political instruments in a geopolitical chess game, merely as pawns to be moved around, rewarded, punished, banished, or elevated as political winds shift. Nowhere else in the world has the ethnic game been quite so draconian. Given this history of persecution on so many sides and from so many different sources, it is not surprising that the first temptation among ethnic authorities is to redress past wrongs through the curriculum in public schools. This raises new problems.

Since there are no traditions of consultation on curricular issues and there is a long-standing tradition of authoritarian curriculum enforcement, it is natural that new, locally designed curricula may exacerbate rather than ameliorate tension. One illustration is that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where curriculum was designed (within the same country) by different ethnic authorities without any enforcement of a consensus. Here, for instance, is part of a 1994 civics textbook intended for junior secondary schools in Bosnia:

> Horrible crimes committed against the non-Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serb-Montenegrin aggressors and domestic chetniks were aimed at creating an ethnically cleansed area where exclusively Serb people would live. In order to carry out this monstrous idea of theirs, they planned to kill or expel hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks and Croats. . . . The criminals began to carry out their plans in the most ferocious way. Horror swept through villages and cities. . . . Looting, raping, and slaughters. . . . screams and outcries of the people being exposed to such horrendous plights. . . . Europe and the rest of the world did nothing to prevent the criminals from ravaging and slaughtering innocent people. (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, 1994, p. 24)

The book continues to condemn not only Serbs, but also the members of their own ethnic group who did not have the proper response:

> Those who ran out of fear and who were not prepared to join those who were defending their country are now living in a foreign country, waiting for someone else to liberate the country for them. . . . such an attitude deserves every condemnation, since not to help the homeland which is bleeding is a treason and a crime of the worst category. (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry, 1994, p. 24)

In this case and others like it, whether the events occurred needs to be kept separate from whether the text is appropriate. The public school experience is intended to mold desired behavior of future citizens; therefore citizens of all different groups must feel comfortable about the content. If one group is uncomfortable, then the school system has

182

abrogated its public function. This Bosnia illustration is an example where such an abrogation of public responsibility occurred.

The central education dilemma. In the ECA region there are two alternative principles, equally legitimate, which conflict with one another. One principle is the demand for national identity on the part of the 27 nations. The other principle concerns the rights of local minorities within each nation. Kazakhstan provides a good illustration.

For many sound nation-building reasons, Kazakhstan has felt the need to develop a broad understanding of its historical and linguistic origins. In essence, Kazakhstan had to create its national heritage largely from scratch, because it had been physically and culturally decimated during the period of the USSR (DeYoung & Balzhan, in press; DeYoung & Valyayeva, 1997; Olcott, 1987; Valyayeva & DeYoung, in press). Authorities renamed the national pedagogical university after Abai Kunabaev, a national poet. Walls of the public schools are peppered with pictures of Kazakh intellectuals who were purged or killed by Stalin in the 1930s. Descriptions of the deeds of ethnic heroes from previous centuries are found in the curriculum today, as are the contributions of pre-Soviet Kazakh statesmen and nationalist parties of the early 20th century (De Young & Nadirbekyzy, 1996, p. 75). Kazakh has been reinstated as a national language in spite of the fact that it is spoken by few of the urban intellectuals, fewer than 1% of the local "Russian" population (which constitutes 37% of the overall Kazakh population), and that there are altogether more than 100 different ethnic groups in Kazakhstan.

The problem is where to draw the line between the need for a national culture and the rights of local minorities. Will ethnic minority interests be better protected in an independent Kazakhstan than they were when Kazakhstan was a part of the USSR? This question is not unique to Kazakhstan, but rather is a universal issue to varying degrees throughout the ECA region. One illustration of a well-managed strategy with respect to this dilemma is the effort put forth by the Ministers of Education representing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, who meet annually to discuss these types of questions with regard to education.

One way to illustrate the importance of positive social interactions among ethnic groups is to draw from an example outside the region, in which text-

book content has been identified as contributing to civil conflict. The example is that of Sri Lanka.

The population of Sri Lanka is divided into many groups, but the two largest are the Sinhalese (74%) and the Tamils (18%). They speak different languages and practice different religions (Buddhism and Hinduism). In the 1950s, national identity in Sri Lanka was an important issue, as it is today for the new countries in the ECA region. Based on an interpretation of "minority rights" prevalent 40 years ago, Sri Lankan school populations were segregated ethnically, as were all textbook materials and supplies. The content and tone for the country's history was decided by the central ministry of education.

In a review years later, however, pedagogical materials were discovered to be far from equal, and not based on an interethnic consensus on content or tone. The dominant historical image presented in the early textbooks was that of a "glorious but embattled Sinhalese nation repeatedly having to defend itself and its Buddhist traditions from the ravages of Tamil invaders" (Nissan, 1996, p. 34). Sinhalese textbooks were scattered with damaging messages conveying images of Tamils as the historical enemies of the Sinhalese. National heroes were chosen whose reputations included having vanquished Tamils in ethnic wars. On the other hand, Tamil text materials emphasized historical figures whose reputations included accommodation and compromise with the Sinhalese. In neither of the texts were there positive illustrations drawn from the other ethnic group. There was no attempt to teach about the contribution of Tamil kings to Buddhist tradition, or the links between Sinhalese kingdoms and Buddhist centers in India. Language texts were largely monocultural in content, with few references to each other's ethnic groups (Nissan, 1996, p. 36).

Because the texts were culturally inflammatory, and because there was no effort to balance the prejudices stemming from outside of the classroom with more positive experiences and illustrations within the classroom, the Sri Lankan schools can be said to have achieved the opposite of the intention of all good public school systems. Instead of laying a foundation for national cooperation and harmony, which is the basic rationale for public schooling, it laid the intellectual foundations for social conflict and civil war.

The lessons for the ECA region could hardly be more clear. Considerable attention has focused on

183

the minority groups in the region (Banton et al., 1985; Byani et al., 1994; Black, 1997; Pettifer & Poulton, 1994; Hlebowish & Hamot, 1997; Krag & Funch, 1994; Liegeois & Gheorghe, 1995; Minority Rights Group & Third World European Economic Community, 1993; Packer, 1996; Schopflin & Poulton, 1978; Sheehy & Nahaylo, 1980; Skutnabb-Kangas, 1990; Vakhtin, 1992). Many organizations have taken an interest in the problems of social studies and civics education, not only because they are concerned as professional educators, but rather because they are concerned about the possible implications of interethnic and national tension. These organizations include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the European Union, the Council of Europe, UNICEF, the Soros Foundations, the American Federation of Teachers, the United States Information Agency (USIA), and many others.[14]

So sensitive have the interethnic problems become that NATO has developed a concern about education on the premise that interethnic tensions expressed through education could well constitute a risk to peace in the region. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a High Commissioner on National Minorities, based in The Hague (Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, 1997). The High Commissioner has already issued recommendations pertaining to the education of the Greek minority population in Albania, the Albanian population in Macedonia, the Slovak population in Hungary, the Hungarian population in Slovakia, and the Hungarian population in Romania (Siemienski & Packer, 1996–1997, p. 190). In 1996, the High Commissioner requested assistance from the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations to work on a possible set of guidelines governing the education rights of national minorities. After a considerable amount of discussion and consultation, these guidelines, known as the Hague Recommendations, were published in 1997 (Siemienski & Packer, pp. 187–198), and can be added to the many other international conventions and regulations that attempt to identify and protect the educational rights of children and various sub-populations.[15]

In general these covenants and conventions pertain to the problems of populations that may be subjected to discrimination and prejudice. They concern the right to be educated in one's mother tongue, the right of fair access to more selective training in higher and vocational education, and freedom from discrimination, cultural bias, and the like. While these issues are indeed important, effectively they address only one half of the problem.

The other half of the problem pertains to the rights of the majority or the rights of the national community. Their educational interests are no less compelling: the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan; the Latvians in Latvia; the Romanians in Romania, and so forth. What is to protect the national community from extremist versions of history as portrayed by curricula designed by minority populations? What are the rights of the national community for having a sense of compromise and historical dignity ascribed to their national culture by minority populations in their own country? What protection does the national community have against the possibility that a minority community within the same country may encourage loyalty to another nation where their ethnic group is more numerous? The problem of civics education has multiple sources, and therefore must involve multiple solutions. Not all solutions can be incorporated under the auspices of the "rights of minorities." None of these conventions addresses this other side of the equation.

While the history of public schooling was established in 17th-century Prussia, it is not true to suggest that the educational challenge of the modern era in the ECA region is analogous. Prussia required social cohesion, but used a centralized authoritarian system to achieve it. The techniques of nation-building in the ECA region are not uniform, but for the most part the countries have emerged from an era of extreme authoritarianism and into one more tolerant of divergence and local opinion. This complicates matters considerably. Not only are these nations faced with achieving cohesion, they are faced with the difficulties of achieving it, for better or worse, through widespread participation in the rules of engagement as well as its direction.

In anticipation of these unprecedented challenges, there have been some recent efforts on the part of the international education community to establish a set of standards for civics education, consistent with the best in local practice (Ministry of Culture and Education, Hungary, 1996). These speak to the necessity for compromise. Instead of attempting to establish the rights and privileges of minority populations, they attempt to delineate the obligations and responsibilities for all populations, majority as well as minority.

184

The proposed international professional guidelines include standards of many kinds. They include standards for curriculum content—for example, presenting different views of history and different opinions as to its contemporary relevance. They include a set of terms to identify different levels of critical thinking—being able to identify a concept, describe it, explain it, evaluate a position about it, and take and/or defend a position concerning it. They include a set of standards for "participation" in civics—being able to manage a conflict, build a consensus, influence others by moderating someone else's view, and so forth. Lastly there are standards proposed for terminologies used in civics—civil society, constitutional rights, private opinion, citizenship obligations, and the like. The sum result of these components constitutes an international precedent because it establishes for the first time an international standard for curriculum excellence in civics.

The purpose of establishing an international professional standard is to actively establish a set of principles against which each country and each local curriculum authority may measure its own civics curriculum (Center for Civics Education, 1994, 1997; CIVITAS, 1995; Heyneman, 1990, 1995b, 1995c). If this effort proves successful, then national authorities around the region will have a professional benchmark by which they can hold local curriculum authorities responsible. The opposite also pertains: Local and minority curriculum authorities will now have an international benchmark by which they can judge the degree to which national curricular authorities are fair and balanced in their views of history, civil rights, and the responsibilities of citizenship.

Part IV. Schools and Social Cohesion in Europe and Central Asia and North America

Empirical comparison awaits the collection of systematic evidence (UNICEF, 1998).[16] Until then, however, it may be useful to have an impression (Heyneman, 1995c, 1999). For certain, tensions that exist in American society also exist in its schools—emotional debates over multicultural curricula, standards for history, bilingual education, sex education, homosexuality, and the use of prayer and religious symbols in the classroom. And to be sure, some of these tensions in the wider society are extremist. Some advocate violence; others claim racial superiority. But however common these extremist views may be in the wider society, they are

not the views allowed in the public schools (Finberg, in press).

And why not? With 15,000 school districts in the U.S., much decentralization, and a weak federal role, how is it there is so little extremism taught in the public school curriculum? The ECA region lacks any tradition of building consensus over curriculum values and objectives; schools themselves (as in Bosnia) may even be used as instruments to escalate a social crisis. By comparison, the debates in the U.S. appear reasoned and reasonable.

Many things are more costly to a nation than a cumbersome and inefficient public school system. However unresponsive it may appear, the U.S. public school system has unique virtues. U.S. schools do not teach sedition against the constitution. They do not teach disrespect toward specific ethnic or religious groups. They do not include in the curriculum materials that amplify political tension with countries to the north or to the south. In spite of its decentralization, none of these are issues for schools in the U.S., but they are very much a part of the educational challenge for school systems in the ECA region.

However troubled schools in the U.S. may seem, leaders of school systems in the ECA region view the U.S. system and wonder at the "beauty of its balance" (Heyneman, 1998a, p. 31). They wonder how agreement can be obtained without the use of terror from Washington, without the use of secret police, or informants, without having to resort to prisons or armies. How is it that there appears to be so much freedom of expression, that so much authority can reside in the hands of so many different interests and yet so few instances of extremism arise in the official curriculum? Local schools are able to operate within tolerable limits because of the buildup of social capital in the society at large. The U.S. is reaping the benefits of multiple generations of autonomous control, where passion and prejudice are modified in lieu of the general good. Whatever its faults, the U.S. is a society that can only be characterized as having a substantial quantity of social capital, especially in comparison to countries in Europe and Central Asia.

Summary

Section I of this paper briefly summarized concepts in economics which pertain to institutions and organizations. It was suggested that economic development of nations is determined in part by the degree to which social contracts can be enforced

185

without coercion, the degree to which a society is able to control itself first by establishing, and then by living up to, its individual obligations and responsibilities. The quantity of this ability is known as "social capital." It was suggested that social capital could be manufactured, or at least influenced, through the use of four categories of organizations—political (legislative bodies), social (churches), economic (firms), and educational (schools and universities).

Section II of this paper briefly reviewed the origins of public education. It was pointed out that the original purpose of public education was not to provide skills of literacy and numeracy, but rather to establish mutual identity and peaceful cooperation across differing ethnic and religious subpopulations. The economic purpose of public schooling has been to build social capital.

Section III of this paper briefly reviewed recent circumstances in the ECA region, where many of the 27 countries have been newly established and all are experiencing degrees of transition from party/state rule to open democracy. In this section it was noted that the educational task in the ECA region is not unlike the educational task in all new nations. It was mentioned, however, that the educational task in societies emerging from the party/state experience is more complex than that in other new nations; and in spite of the effectiveness of education in the past, the education task in an open society and multiparty democracy is considerably more complex than that under a totalitarian regime. The unique ethnic and religious history of the ECA region was noted as a complicating factor. Many interventions were reviewed; several case examples of both laudable and reprehensible practice were described. Establishing an international standard of civics education was mentioned as being a unique precedent.

Countries in the ECA region are finding that nation-building in the 21st century is significantly different than in earlier eras. Social cohesion, particularly in 17th-century Europe, could be enforced by using a single authoritarian control. Today, authoritarian control has been replaced with multiple local initiatives, open access to uncensored information, and an ideal of democratic policymaking. Many authorities find themselves without sufficient experience and without the traditions for compromise and consensus necessary for success. Though countries in the ECA region may vary substantially from one another, in general, social cohesion is an uncertain goal with an uncertain future.

Nevertheless, within the context of the 21st century, social cohesion is a necessary and universal objective. Education can only successfully contribute in conjunction with the other organizational pillars: social, political, and commercial. And within education there are again multiple mechanisms. However, in terms of civics education and enlightened history, these mechanisms are no guarantee of peace or social cohesion. On the other hand, if the civics curriculum is inflammatory and if the content of the history curriculum makes neighbors "uncomfortable," then the absence of peace is guaranteed.

In terms of the U.S., it seems clear that the social cohesion objectives of the public school system are essential for future peace and prosperity. And despite protracted debates over the amount of time devoted to one or another special interest, it is fair to say that the underlying premise for obtaining a common purpose is sound. As a result, the general performance of the U.S. school system in terms of supporting social cohesion compares favorably with that of many other parts of the world.

Notes

[1] I am grateful to Walter Feinberg at the University of Illinois for helping me appreciate this distinction.

[2] Measurements of human capital have commonly been confined to the length of "exposure" to schooling with benefits calculated on the basis of marginal returns to differences in earnings on the basis of that exposure. Though there has been much speculation about the "social returns" to schooling, it is common to assume that its measurement is based on earnings. Social capital, on the other hand, does not assume earnings to be a proxy for benefits (Heyneman, 1995d).

[3] Though many have studied specific traditions, religious, ethnographic, and the like, Shils is the only source on the nature of tradition itself (Shils, 1981).

[4] In terms of social capital, the history of many ECA countries is quite worrying. As Putnam points out:

> Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused that limited stock of social capital, the Hobbesian outcomes of the Mezzogiorno—amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation—seem likelier than successful democratization and economic development. Palermo may represent the future of Moscow. (Putnam, 1993, p. 183)

[5] In contrast to developing countries today, the first public school systems in Prussia, New England, and the Netherlands did not expand schooling. Rather they reorganized and coordinated the different school systems

186

that already existed under the auspices of voluntary and religious organizations.

[6] This distinction between European public education (which included public roles for sectarian schools) and U.S. public education (in which the state monopolized the provision of public education) remains to this day. However, the rationales for public education in the beginning were quite similar.

[7] The fact that U.S. students have recently won gold medals in the international mathematics Olympiads simultaneously with low U.S. results on international tests of mathematics achievement reiterates the point that Olympiads may not be the best indicator of quality for a nation's school system.

[8] Though they share a common party/state heritage, differences, and hence the social cohesion challenges, among the 27 states are pronounced. Some states in the Baltics and North Central Europe (The Czech and Slovak republics, Poland, Hungary) have democratic traditions and a relatively short history of party/state domination. Others (such as Albania and Romania) with similarly short domination, suffered in addition from the weight of a cult of personality, leaving them relatively less prepared for an open society. Some states (such as Georgia and Armenia) have had long contact with western traditions through religious affiliations; but others (such as Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic) had little western contact prior to the 1990s. The successor states of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia) differ among themselves, but all reflect the benefits of the Tito era in which information and trade were relatively abundant. And of course Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine, though equipped with sophisticated tradition in literature, art, and sciences, experienced only brief democratic periods prior to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The social cohesion challenge differs in part according to a country's prior experience with democratic traditions.

[9] A unique aspect of education under the party/state was the active campaign against religion. Religious schools were closed. Teachers were exhorted to create "godless corners" in every public school classroom and to "teach atheism with enthusiasm, knowledge, care, devotion and dedication." A special state publishing house for atheism was created in 1922 and distributed publications titled *Bezbozhnik* [Godless], *Bezbozhnik u stanka* [Atheist at the Workbench], and *Antireligiuznik* [Anti-Religious Effort]. A seminary was established for the training of "atheistic leaders" (Brickman, 1972, 1974).

[10] One piece of confirming evidence behind this assertion is the speed and thoroughness with which this ideology was jettisoned after 1991. This has left whole populations in search of new identities, which has contributed to a resurgence of long-repressed ethnicity.

[11] Demand was affected within as well as between

disciplines. In history, paleontology was considered more prestigious than 20th-century history for the same reasons that affected the prestige of history versus solid state physics.

[12] Of the adult Russian population with higher education degrees in 1980, 71% had degrees in engineering. This compares to 27% in Germany and 9% in the United States (Heyneman, 1998b).

[13] Social studies places emphasis on economics and sociology; civics places emphasis on political science, government, and law.

[14] In addition, there has been ample precedent provided by the challenge of reducing educational curriculum-based tensions in Western Europe (Covey, Evans, Green, Macaro, & Mellor, 1997; Fogelman & Edwards, 1997; Shennan, 1997; Slater, 1997).

[15] These include the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919; the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948; the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education in 1960; the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1959; the subsequent UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989; the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950; the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995; the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 1992; the Council of Europe Charter on Regional or Minority Languages in 1992; the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice in 1978; the Copenhagen Declaration of the Conference of the Human Dimension in 1990; and the UN Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1993 (Thornberry & Gibbons, 1996–1997, pp. 115–152).

[16] Some of this evidence may be forthcoming with the new international study of Civics Education sponsored by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, which should be able to report results in 2002. First to appear has been a set of case studies (Torney-Purta, Schwille, & Amadeo, 1999).

References

Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, C. A. (1959). The educational dilemmas of the USSR. *School Review, 67*(Spring), 26–44.

Anweiler, O. (1992). Some historical aspects of educational change in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. *Oxford Studies in Comparative Education* [Special issue on education and economic change in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union], *2*(1), 29–39.

Bailey, S. K. (1963). The school and political development. In H. W. Burns (Ed.), *Education and the development of nations* (pp. 56–59). Syracuse, NY: Center for Development Education, Syracuse University.

Banton, M., Blackstone, T., Coussins, J., Darlington, S., van der Gaag, N., Gerlach, L., Hall, T., Hicks, D., Hubbard, S., Lightfoot, M., Little, A., Stubbs, W., & Twitchin, J. (1985). *Teaching about prejudice*. London: Minority Rights Group.

Bates, R. (1989). *Beyond the miracle of the market: The potential economy of agrarian development in Kenya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Becker, E. (1963). Personality development in the modern world: Beyond Freud and Marx. In H. W. Burns (Ed.), *Education and the development of nations* (pp. 83–106). Syracuse, NY: Center for Development Education, Syracuse University.

Black, M. (1997, January). *Children and families of ethnic minorities, immigrants, and indigenous peoples*. Presentation at the Innocenti Global Seminar, Florence, Italy: UNICEF.

Bosnia and Herzegovenia, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. (1994). *Poznavanje Prirodei Drustva* [Nature and society]. Sarajevo: Author.

Brickman, W. (1972). Atheism, religion, and education in the Soviet Union. *School and Society*, 246–253.

Brickman, W. (1974). Resistance to atheistic education in the Soviet Union. *Journal of Thought, 9*(1), 97–107.

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1968). Soviet methods of character education. In R. J. Havighurst (Ed.), *Comparative perspectives on education* (pp. 57–66). Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Broxup, M. B. (Ed.). (1992). *The North Caucasus barrier: The Russian advance toward the Muslim world*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Broxup, M. B., & Bennigsen, A. (1983). *The Islamic threat to the Soviet State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bushnell, H. (1847). *Discourses on Christian Nature*. Boston: Massachusetts Sabbath School Society.

Butts, R. F. (1980). *The revival of civic learning: A rationale for citizenship education in American schools*. Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa Education Foundation.

Byani, C., Graham-Brown, S., Gundara, J., Jones, C., Thornberry, P., & Warner, R. (1994). *Education rights and minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group, Ltd.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1976). *The American voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Center for Civics Education. (1994). *National standards for civics and government*. Calabasas, CA: Center for Civics Education.

Chazan, B. I., & Soltis, J. F. (Eds.). (1974). *Moral education*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Civic Education Project. (1997). *Education for the transition: Social science teaching at Central and Eastern European universities*. Budapest: Createch Ltd.

CIVITAS-International. (1995). *Strengthening citizenship and civic education, east and west: Conference proceedings*. Washington DC: USIA.

Coleman, J. S. (1986). *Individual interests and collective action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coleman, J. S. (1987). Norms as social capital. In G. Radnitzky & P. Bernholz (Eds.), *Economic imperialism* (pp. 133–155). New York: Paragon.

Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology, 94*, 95–120.

Comer, J. P. (1988). Educating poor minority children. *Scientific American, 29*(5), 42–48.

Corman, H. (1986). The demand for education for home production. *Economic Inquiry, 24*, 213–230.

Covey, A., Evans, M., Green, S., Macaro, E., & Mellor, J. (1997). *Pupil's perceptions of Europe*. London: Cassell.

Cremin, L. A. (1976). *Public education*. New York: Basic Books.

Datton, Rev. W. S. (1848). The proposed substitution of secretarian for public schools. *Common School Journal, 10*(11), 166–168.

DeWitt, N. (1968). Educational policy in a socialist state. In R. J. Havighurst (Ed.), *Comparative perspectives on education* (pp. 43–49). Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

DeYoung, A., & Balzhan, S. (in press). Issues in post-Soviet secondary school reform: The case of Kazakhstan. *International Journal of Education Reform*.

DeYoung, A., & Valyayeva, G. (1997). Post-Soviet secondary school reform in Kazakhstan: The views of the 149 classroom teachers. *Central Asia Monitor, 3*, 22–34.

DeYoung, A. J., & Nadirbekyzy, B. (1996). Redefining schooling and communism in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. In A. J. Young (Ed.), *Politics of education association yearbook* (pp. 71–78). Washington, DC: Falmer Press.

Duncan, G. J. (1976). Earnings functions and nonpecuniary benefits. *Journal of Human Resources, 11*, 464–483.

Eggertsson, T. (1990). *Economic behavior and institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ehrilch, I. (1975). On the relationship between education and crime. In F. T. Juster (Ed.), *Education, income and human behavior*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Eisemon, T. O., Ionescu-Sisesti, I., Davis, C. H., & Gaillard, J. (1995). Reforming Romania's national research system. *Research Policy, 25*, 107–131.

Eklof, B., & Dneprov, E. (1993). *Democracy and the Russian school: The reform movement since 1984*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Feinberg, W. (in press). *Common schools/uncommon identities: Cultural difference, national unity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Fogelman, K., & Edwards, J. (1997). *Education for citizenship: A pedagogic dossier*. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe.

188

Gintis, H. (1971). Education, technology, and the characteristics of worker productivity. *American Economic Review, 61,* 266–279.

Glenn, C. L. (1988). *The myth of the common school.* Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.

Glenn, C. L. (1995). *Educational freedom in Eastern Europe.* Washington, DC: Cato Institute.

Hahn, C. L. (1977). *Comparative perspectives on citizenship: A five nation study.* Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Haveman, R. H., & Wolfe, B. (1984). Schooling and economic well-being: The role of nonmarket effects. *Journal of Human Resources, 19,* 378–407.

Haveman, R. H., & Wolfe, B. (1994). *Succeeding generations: On the effects of investments in children.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Helmreich, E. (1959). *Christian Religious education in German schools: An historical approach.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Heyneman, S. P. (1990). Education on the world market. *American School Board Journal, 177*(3), 28–29.

Heyneman, S. P. (1994). *Issues of education finance and management in ECA and OECD countries* (HRO Working Paper #26). Washington DC: World Bank.

Heyneman, S. P. (1995a). Education in the Europe and Central Asia region: Policies of adjustment and excellence. In F. J. H. Mertons (Ed.), *Reflections on education in Russia* (pp. 23–53). Amersfort, The Netherlands: Acco.

Heyneman, S. P. (1995b). Thoughts on social stabilization in the formally planned economies. In *Strengthening citizenship and civic education, east and west: conference proceedings* (pp. 71–74). Washington, DC: USIA.

Heyneman, S. P. (1995c). America's most precious export. *American School Board Journal, 182*(3), 23–26.

Heyneman, S. P. (1995d). Economics of education: Disappointments and potential. *Prospects, XXV*(4), 559–583.

Heyneman, S. P. (1997a). Education and social stabilization in Russia. *Compare, 27*(1), 5–8.

Heyneman, S. P. (1997b). Economic development and the international trade in education reform. *Prospects, XXVII*(4), 501–531.

Heyneman, S. P. (1997c, May). Russian vocational and technical education in the transition: Tradition, adaptation, unresolved problems. *Institute for the Study of Russian Education Newsletter,* pp. 22–34.

Heyneman, S. P. (1997d). Educational choice in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. *Education Economics, 5*(3), 333–339.

Heyneman, S. P. (1998a). In defense of American education. *The School Administrator, 55*(8), 30–34.

Heyneman, S. P. (1998b). Transition from party/state to open democracy: The role of education. *International Journal of Education Development, 18*(1), 21–40.

Heyneman, S. P. (1999). American education: View from the outside. *International Journal of Leadership in Education, 2*(1), 31–41.

Heyneman, S. P., & Todoric-Bebic, S. (in press). A renewed sense for the purposes of schooling: Education and social cohesion in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe and Central Asia. *Prospects.*

Hlebowish, P. S., & Hamot, G. E. (1997). *American pragmatism and civic education reform in the Czech Republic.* Iowa City, IA: College of Education, University of Iowa. (mimeographed)

Hoffer, E. (1958). *The true believer.* New York: New American Library.

Hyman, H. H., & Wright, C. R. (1979). *Education's lasting influence on values.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Inkeles, A., & Smith, D. H. (1974). *Becoming modern.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kamens, D. (1998). Education and democracy: A comparative institutional analysis. *Sociology of Education, 61,* 114–127.

Karavetz, N. (1978). Education of ethnic and national minorities in the USSR: A report on current developments. *Comparative Education, 10,* 193–200.

Kerr, S. T. (1990). Will glasnost lead to perestroika? Directions of educational reform in the USSR. *Educational Researcher, 19*(7), 26–31.

Kerr, S. T. (1994). Diversification of Russian education. In A. Jones (Ed.), *Education and society in the new Russia* (pp. 27–47). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Kirkwood, M. (1991). Glasnost: "The national question" and Soviet language policy. *Soviet Studies, 43,* 61–81.

Krag, H., & Funch, L. (1994). *The North Caucasus: Minorities at a crossroads.* London: Minority Rights Group.

Levitsky, M. L., & van den Broek, L. (1995). *Economics education: A core curriculum.* Den Haag and Enschede, The Netherlands: Bureau Cross and Educaplan.

Liegeois J., & Gheorghe, N. (1995). *Roma/Gypsies: A European minority.* London: Minority Rights Group.

Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review, 53,* 69–105.

Maynew, M. J. (1985). *Schooling in Western Europe: A social history.* Albany, NY: SUNY.

McClelland, D. C. (1963). Changing values for progress. In H. W. Burns (Ed.), *Education and the development of nations* (pp. 60–105). Syracuse, NY: Center for Development Education, Syracuse University.

McConnell, G. (1963). The political aims of education in developing countries. In H.W. Burns (Ed.), *Education and the development of nations* (pp. 39–56). Syracuse, NY: Center for Development Education, Syracuse University.

Meyer, J. W. (1970). The charter: Conditions of diffuse socialization in schools. In W. R. Scott (Ed.), *Social*

189

processes and social structure (pp. 564–578). New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston.

Michael, R. T. (1982). Measuring non-monetary benefits of education: A survey. In W. McMahon & T. Geske (Eds.), *Financing education: Overcoming inefficiency and inequity*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Ministry of Culture and Education, Hungary. (1996). *National core curriculum*. Budapest, Hungary: Author.

Minority Rights Group & Third World European Economic Community. (Eds.). (1993). *Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Minority Rights Group, Ltd.

Mitter, W. (1996). Democracy and education in Central and Eastern Europe. In A. Oldenquist (Ed.), *Can democracy be taught?* Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation.

Nie, N. H., Junn, J., & Stehlik, B. K. (1996). *Education and democratic citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Niemi, R., & Hepburn, M. (1995). The rebirth of political socialization. *Perspectives on Political Science, 24*, 7–16.

Nissan, E. (1996). *Sri Lanka: A bitter harvest*. London: Minority Rights Group.

North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olcott, M. B. (1987). *The Kazaks*. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Olson, M. (1977). The treatment of externalities in national income statistics. In L. Wingo & A. Evans (Eds.), *Public economics and the quality of life*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Olson, M. (1982). *The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Olson, M., & Zeckhauser, R. (1974). The priority of public problems. In R. Marris (Ed.), *The corporate society*. London: Macmillan.

Packer, J. (1996). On the content of minority rights. In J. Raikka (Ed.), *Do we need minority rights? Conceptual issues* (pp. 121–178). The Hague: Martinus, Nijhoff Publishers.

Pettifer, J. & Poulton, H. (1994). *The Southern Balkans*. London: Minority Rights Group.

Prucha, J. (1992). Trends in Czechoslovak education. In W. Mitter, M. Weiss, & V. Schaefer, (Eds.), *Recent trends in East European education*. Frankfurt: Institute for International Education Research.

Puryear, J. M. (1994). *Thinking politics: Intellectuals and democracy in Chile 1973–1988*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ruffin, M. H., McCarter, J., & Upjohn, R. (1996). *The post-Soviet handbook: A guide to grassroots organizations and internet resources in the newly independent states*. Seattle, WA: Center for Civil Society International.

Rywkin, M. (1990). *Moscow's Muslim challenge: Soviet Central Asia*. London: M. E. Sharpe.

Samuelson, R. J. (1998, January 12). The way the world works. *Newsweek*, p. 52.

Schopflin, G., & Poulton, H. (1978). *Romania's ethnic Hungarians*. London: Minority Rights Group.

Shadrikov, V. (1993). Ethnic cultural and national requirements in the education policy of the former Soviet Union. In K. Schleicher (Ed.), *Nationalism in education* (pp. 135–151). Sonderdurck, The Netherlands: Peter Lang Publishers.

Sheehy, A., & Nahaylo, B. (1980). *The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians: Soviet treatment of some national minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group.

Shennan, M. (1997). *Teaching about Europe*. London: Cassell.

Shils, E. (1981). *Tradition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Shorish, M. M. (1984). Planning by decree: Soviet language policy in Central Asia. *Language Problems and Language Planning, 8*(1), 35–49.

Shorish, M. M. (1991). The Uzbeks and Tajiks: Conflict resolution and the Soviet experience. In P. L. Dash (Ed.), *The Russian dilemma: The ethnic aftermath* (pp. 53–73). Cuttack, India: Prakashan Publishers.

Siemienski, G., & Packer, J. (1996–1997). Integration through education: Origin and development of The Hague Recommendations. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 4*(2), 187–198.

Skutnabb–Kangas, T. (1990). *Language, literacy, and minorities*. London: Minority Rights Group, Ltd.

Slater, J. (1997). *Teaching history in the new Europe*. London: Cassell.

Stuurman, S. (1983). *Verzuiling, Kapitalisme, en Patriarchaat*. Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Socialistiese Uitgeveriz.

Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations. (1997, June). *The role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE conflict prevention*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Author.

Thornberry, P., & Gibbons, D. (1996–1997). Education and minority rights: A short survey of international standards. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 4*(2), 115–152.

Torney-Purta, J. (1995). Psychological theory as a basis for political socialization research. *Perspectives on Political Science, 24*, 23–33.

Torney-Purta, J. (1996). The Second IEA Civics Education Project: Development of content guidelines and items for a cross-national test and survey. *Canadian and International Education, 25,* 199–213.

Torney-Purta, J. (1997). Links and missing links between education, political knowledge and citizenship. *American Journal of Education, 105*(4), 446–457.

Torney-Purta, J., Oppenheim, A. N., & Farnen, R. (1975). *Civic education in ten countries: An empirical study.* New York: Halsted.

Torney-Purta, J., & Schwille, J. (1986). Civic values learned in school: Policy and practice in industrialized nations. *Comparative Education Review, 30*(1), 30–49.

Torney-Purta, J., Schwille, J., & Amadeo, J. (Eds). (1999). *Twenty-four national case studies.* Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Assessment.

UNICEF. (1998). *Education for all?* Florence, Italy: International Child Development Centre.

Usachev, A. (1994). *Adventures of a little man.* Moscow: Samovar Publishing House.

Vakhtin, N. (1992). *Native peoples of the Russian Far North.* London: Minority Rights Group.

Valyayeva, G., & DeYoung, A. J. (in press). On the status of teachers and teaching in Kazakhstan's post-Soviet system of secondary education. *East-West Education.*

Verba, S., Nie, N., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and political equality: A seven nation comparison.* London: Cambridge University Press.

W. W. B. (no further information). (1957, January 5). A Soviet view of educational thought. *School and Society,* pp. 13–14.

Wachtel, P. (1975). The effect of school quality on achievement, attainment levels, and lifetime earnings. *Explorations in Economic Research, 2,* 502–536.

Wheeler, G. (1962). *Racial problems in Soviet Muslim Asia.* London: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, J., Williams, N., & Sugarman, B. (1967). *Introduction to moral education.* Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books.

Wolfe, B., & Zuvekas, S. (1997, May). *Non-market outcomes of schooling.* Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty. (mimeographed)

World Bank. (1995). *Russia: Education in the transition.* Washington, DC: World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region.

Author

STEPHEN P. HEYNEMAN is a professor of comparative education policy at Peabody College, Center for Education Policy, PO Box 317, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203.

191